ABSTRACT Certificate-based cryptography is an attractive public-key setting, and it not only simplifies certificate management in the traditional public-key cryptography but also eliminates the key escrow problem inherent in the identity-based cryptography. Recently, leakage-resilient cryptography resistant to side-channel attacks has received significant attention from cryptographic researchers. By side-channel attacks, adversaries could obtain partial information of secret and private keys involved in cryptographic algorithms by perceiving execution time or energy consumptions of each algorithm invocation. The certificate-based signature (CBS) is a class of important public-key signature. Up to date, there exists no leakage-resilient CBS (LR-CBS) scheme resistant to side-channel attacks. In this paper, the first LR-CBS scheme is proposed and it possesses overall unbounded leakage property, namely, it permits adversaries to continuously obtain partial information of secret or private keys involved in the associated algorithm invocations. The security analysis is given to prove that the proposed LR-CBS scheme is existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks for adversaries in the generic bilinear group model.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the traditional public-key cryptography [1] , [2] , a user usually selects her/his secret key and then computes the corresponding public key. Hence, each user requires a certificate to provide a trusted binding between the user's public key and identity information. Meanwhile, a public-key infrastructure (PKI) has to be created to manage certificates of all users. The concept of identity (ID)-based cryptography [3] , [4] was introduced to remove certificate management. In an ID-based public-key setting, a user's identity is viewed as the user's public key so that no certificate is required.
In addition, a private key generator (PKG) with a system secret key is responsible to generate the user's private keys according to the user's identity information. In such a case, it incurs the key escrow problem. It means that the PKG may decrypt any cipher-texts sent to arbitrary user, and sign any messages on behalf of arbitrary user. In 2003, the concept of certificateless cryptography [5] was presented to resolve the key escrow problem. In a certificateless public-key setting,
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Sedat Akleylek. a user's private key consists of two components, namely, one is a secret key chosen by the user himself/herself and the other is a partial private key generated by a trusted key generation center (KGC). Since the KGC does not know the user's secret key, the key escrow problem is resolved. It is worth mentioning that the certificateless public-key setting do not require certificate to validate the user's public key so that it must provide additional mechanisms to revoke misbehaving users [6] , [7] .
The notion of certificate-based cryptography was introduced by Gentry [8] to simplify certificate management in the traditional public-key cryptography and eliminate the key escrow problem inherent in the ID-based cryptography. As compared with the certificateless cryptography, the certificate-based cryptography does not require additional revocation mechanisms. In a certificate-based public-key setting, a user first sets her/his secret/public key pair while sending the public key to a trusted certificate authority (CA). By the user's public key, identity information and validity period, the CA generates the user's associated certificate, where the certificate is viewed as a part of the user's private key. Hence, for certificate-based signature (CBS) and encryption (CBE) schemes, a user must use both her/his upto-date certificate and secret key to sign a message or decrypt a cipher-text.
The adversary models of those public-key settings mentioned above (namely, traditional, ID-based, certificateless and certificated-based public-key settings) have a nature assumption that secret and private keys involved in cryptographic algorithms must be entirely hidden to adversaries. Recently, a new type of threat, called ''side-channel attack'', endangers the security of cryptographic schemes based on these public key settings. By side-channel attacks, adversaries could obtain partial information of secret and private keys involved in cryptographic algorithms by perceiving execution time or energy consumptions [9] - [12] of each algorithm invocation. Recently, leakage-resilient cryptography resistant to side-channel attacks has received significant attention from cryptographic researchers. Based on various public-key settings, numerous leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives (encryption and signature schemes) have been proposed to address side-channel attacks, such as leakage-resilient encryption schemes [13] , [14] , leakageresilient signature schemes [15] , [16] , leakage-resilient ID-based encryption schemes [17] , [18] , leakage-resilient ID-based signature schemes [19] , [20] , leakage-resilient certificateless encryption schemes [21] , [22] and leakageresilient certificateless signature schemes [23] .
Based on certificate-based public-key settings, several leakage-resilient certificate-based encryption (LR-CBE) [24] - [26] have been proposed, but there exists no leakage-resilient CBS (LR-CBS) scheme resistant to side-channel attacks. In this paper, we aim at the design of the first LR-CBS scheme with overall unbounded leakage property in the sense that it permits adversaries to continuously obtain partial information of the secret or private keys involved in the associated cryptographic algorithms.
A. RELATED WORK
In the section, we first briefly review the related leakage-resilient signature schemes with overall unbounded leakage property under various kinds of public-key settings. In addition, the related work of the previously proposed CBS schemes is also recalled.
Generally, a cryptographic scheme composes of several phases or algorithms. A leakage-resilient cryptographic scheme is still secure even if partial information of secret and private keys involved in cryptographic algorithms is leaked to adversaries. For leakage information amount during the life time of the cryptographic scheme, there are two kinds of leakage models. One is bounded leakage model [27] in the sense that the total leakage amount musts be bounded to a fixed bitlength. The other is continuous leakage model [19] , [22] that allows adversaries to continuously obtain partial information of secret and private keys while the total leakage amount is unbounded. Obviously, the continuous leakage model with overall unbounded leakage property is more practical than the bounded leakage model.
Under traditional public-key settings, two leakage-resilient signature schemes with overall unbounded leakage property were proposed. In 2013, Galindo and Vivek [15] proposed a secure leakage-resilient signature scheme overall unbounded leakage property in the generic bilinear group (GBG) model [28] . To improve performance, Tang et al. [16] proposed an improvement on Galindo and Vivek's scheme. In 2016, Wu et al. [19] defined an adversary model of leakage-resilient ID-based signature (LR-IBS) schemes under the continual leakage model and proposed the first LR-IBS scheme based on an ID-based public-key setting. Under the continual leakage model, Wu et al.'s scheme allows adversaries to leak partial information of the PKG's system secret key in the key extract phase and users' private keys in the signing phase for each algorithm invocation. In 2018, based on a certificateless public-key setting, Wu et al. [23] also proposed leakage-resilient certificateless signature (LR-CLS) scheme with overall unbounded leakage property. In the generic bilinear group model, Wu et al. formally proved that both LR-IBS scheme and LR-CLS scheme are existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks of adversaries.
In the following, we briefly review the related work of certificate-based signature (CBS) scheme. In 2004, Kang et al. [29] presented the first CBS scheme based on bilinear pairings [4] . Afterward, Li et al. [30] defined a new adversary model (security notion) of CBS schemes and introduced a new attack, the key replacement attack on the certificate-based public-key setting. In addition, Li et [31] presented two CBS schemes, namely, a CBS scheme without pair operation in the random oracle model and a CBS scheme under the standard model (without using random oracles). In 2009, Zhang et al. [32] demonstrated that Liu et al.'s CBS scheme without pair operation was insecure and presented an improvement. Meanwhile, Wu et al. [33] also proposed the other improved CBS scheme on Liu et al.'s CBS scheme without pair operation in the random oracle model. The signature lengths of these CBS schemes [29] - [33] are at least two group elements. For reducing the signature length, the first short certificate-based signature (SCBS) scheme was proposed by Liu et al. [34] . However, Cheng et al. [35] demonstrated that Liu et al.'s SCBS scheme cannot resist the attacks of Type I adversary under the accredited adversary model [30] , [32] , [33] . In 2012, Li et al. [36] also proposed an improved SCBS scheme. In 2016, Hung et al. [37] demonstrated that Li et al.'s SCBS scheme is still insecure against Type I adversary and proposed a provably secure and novel SCBS scheme.
The security of these CBS and SCBS schemes mentioned above is under the accredited adversary model [30] , [32] , [33] , [37] which includes two kinds of adversaries, namely, Type I (uncertified entity) and Type II adversary (honest-butcurious CA). In 2016, Liu and Li [38] defined an enhanced adversary model of the CBS schemes. In the enhanced adversary model, a Type II adversary is changed from an honestbut-curious CA to a malicious-but-passive CA. Under the new adversary model, Liu and Li demonstrated that the previous CBS schemes suffer from malicious-but-passive certificate authority attack, namely, the CA may forge a new signature (ID, m, σ ) from an existing signature (ID, m, σ ), where ID and m are the same identity and message, respectively. Zhou and Cui [39] also proposed a new CBS scheme under the enhanced adversary model. Nevertheless, the maliciousbut-passive CA cannot forge a signature on an arbitrary message m if a signer with identity ID did not generate a signature on the message m. Indeed, the adversary model defined in [30] , [32] , [33] , and [37] is enough to model the abilities of adversaries.
B. CONTRIBUTION AND ORGANIZATION
Up to date, no leakage-resilient CBS (LR-CBS) scheme resistant to side-channel attacks is proposed. In this paper, we first define a new adversary model of LR-CBS schemes resistant to side-channel attacks under the continual leakage model. The adversary model also consists of two types of adversaries, Type I (uncertified entity) and Type II adversary (honest-but-curious CA). Both types of adversaries are extended from the accredited adversary models of CBS and SCBS schemes [30] , [32] , [33] , [37] by adding two extra key leakage queries, namely, the certificate generation leak and signing leak queries. Both adversaries are permitted to continuously obtain partial information of the secret or private keys involved in the associated algorithm invocations.
Under the new adversary model with continual key leakage, the first LR-CBS scheme resistant to side-channel attacks is proposed and it possesses overall unbounded leakage property. For achieving overall unbounded leakage property, the proposed LR-CBS scheme adopts the key update technique used in [15] , [19] , [22] , and [23] to refresh the CA's system secret key after (before) running each certificate generation algorithm and a signer's secret key and certificate after (before) running each signing algorithm. It is worth mentioning that the CA's and each signer's public keys are still unchanged. In the key update technique, the CA's system secret key is partitioned into two components while each signer's secret key and certificate are also divided into two components, respectively. Although adversaries may obtain partial information of two corresponding current components in the associated algorithm invocations, it is useless for recovering the original secret keys or certificates. In the generic bilinear group model [28] , the security of the proposed LR-CBS scheme is formally proved to be existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks of Types I and II adversaries under the new adversary model with continual key leakage.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Preliminaries are given in Section 2. In Section 3 demonstrates the framework and adversary model of LR-CBS schemes. A secure LR-CBS scheme resistant to side-channel attacks is presented in Section 4. The security of the proposed LR-CBS scheme is proved in Section 5. Comparisons with the previously proposed CBS and SCBS schemes are given in Section 6. In Section 7, conclusion and future work are discussed.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Here, several preliminaries are presented as follows.
A. ENTROPY
In order to measure the security impact of leakage information of secret values involved in cryptographic algorithms, we introduce the notion of entropy. Entropy is viewed as an estimation of uncertainty for unknown secret values. Let X and Y be two finite discrete random variables. Let Pr[X = x] and Pr[Y = y] represent the associated probabilities of X = x and Y = y, respectively. The min-entropy of a random variable denotes the estimation of some value with the largest probability. In the following, we define two kinds of minentropies.
1. Min-entropy of X :
Indeed, an unknown secret value may be regarded as a discrete random variable. For discrete random variables with partial leakage information, two consequences are derived as follows.
Lemma 1 [40] : Let f : X → {0, 1} λ represent a leakage function on a secret value X (i.e. a discrete random variable) while its output bit-length is bounded to λ bits. The average conditional min-entropy of X under the event f (X ) has
Lemma 2 [15] : Let F ∈ Z p [X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n ] denote a non-zero polynomial of degree at most d while associating a leakage function with the maximal output bit-length λ. Let P i (for i = 1, 2, . . . , n) be the associated probability distributions on
B. BILINEAR GROUPS
Let G =< g > and G T represent two multiplicative cyclic groups of a prime order p. A mapê : G × G → G T is an admissible bilinear pairing map if the following properties hold:
Computability: for all u, v ∈ G, the operationê(u, v) can be computed efficiently. 3. Non − degeneracy:ê(g, g) =1 which is regarded as a generator of G T . For the detailed settings of bilinear groups, a reader may refer to [4] , [6] , [41] , and [42] . VOLUME 7, 2019 
C. GENERIC BILINEAR GROUP MODEL
The generic bilinear group model [28] is regarded as a kind of adversary model that is played by an adversary and a challenger. For performing group operations, the adversary must issue the corresponding group queries (oracles) to the challenger to return the executing results. In the generic bilinear group model, three group queries Q G , Q T and Q p represent the multiplication operation on the group G, the multiplication operation on the group G T and the bilinear pairing map operation, respectively. In this model, each group element must be represented by a distinct bit string. To do so, two random injective functions : Z p → ζ and T : Z p → ζ T are employed to map the elements of G and G T to two sets of bit strings ζ and ζ T , respectively. |ζ | and |ζ T |, respectively, denote the amounts of all elements of ζ and ζ T while satisfying |ζ | = |ζ T | = p and ζ ∩ζ T = φ. For any u, v ∈ Z * p , Q G , Q T and Q p , respectively, have the following properties.
Note that (1) represents the generator g of G and T (1) denotes the generatorê(g, g) of G T . In the generic bilinear group model, if a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary can efficiently find a collision of the multiplicative group G or G T , it means that the adversary may solve the discrete logarithm problem on G or G T [28] .
III. FRAMEWORK AND ADVERSARY MODEL
In this section, we define a new framework and adversary model of leakage-resilient certificate-based signature (LR-CBS) schemes resistant to side-channel attacks under the continual leakage model.
A. FRAMEWORK OF LR-CBS SCHEME
A LR-CBS scheme composes of two roles, namely, users (signers/verifiers) and a trusted certificate authority (CA). A user with identity ID first sets her/his secret/public key pair (SK ID , PK ID ) while sending the public key PK ID to the CA. By the user's PK ID , ID and validity period, the CA uses a system secret key SK CA to generate the user's associated certificate CK ID , where CK ID is viewed as a part of the user's private key. Hence, a user's private key consists of her/his secret key SK ID and up-to-date certificate CK ID .
For achieving the overall unbounded leakage [15] , [19] , [22] , [23] a user's secret key SK ID and certificate CK ID must be divided into two parts and separately stored in the memory. Also, the CA's system secret key SK CA is divided and stored. The point is that the CA's system secret key must be updated after (before) running each certificate generation algorithm and a user's secret key and certificate after (before) running each signing algorithm. The detailed framework of LR-CBS scheme is defined as follows. -
Here, Rf CG,i , Rh CG,i , Rf S,j and Rh S,j denote the random values used in the computation rounds of the associated algorithm invocations.
Based on the accredited adversary model of CBS schemes [30] , [32] , [33] , [37] , a new adversary model of LR-CBS scheme is defined here. In this model, during the life time of LR-CBS scheme, adversaries are permitted to continuously get partial information of the CA's system secret key used in each Certificate generation algorithm invocation, a signer's secret key and certificate used in the signing phase, and random values involved in both algorithm invocations. The new adversary model consists of two types of adversaries, namely, Type I (uncertified entity) and Type II adversary (honest-but-curious CA).
-Type I adversary (uncertified entity): This adversary is able to obtain the secret key of any entity, but cannot get the certificate of a target entity. Meanwhile, the adversary can get partial information of both the CA's current system secret key in each Certificate generation algorithm invocation and a signer's certificate in each Signing algorithm invocation. -Type II adversary (honest-but-curious CA): This adversary possesses the system secret key so that it is able to generate the certificate of any entity, but cannot get the secret key of a target entity. Meanwhile, the adversary can get partial information of a signer's current secret key in each Signing algorithm invocation. In the following, we employ a security game G LR−CBS to represent the new adversary model of LR-CBS scheme under the continual leakage model.
Definition 2 (G LR−CBS ):
The security game G LR−CBS is played by an adversary A (Types I or II adversaries) and a challenger B. If no PPT adversary A with a non-negligible advantage can win G LR−CBS , we say that the LR-CBS scheme is existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks (UF-LR-CBS-ACMA). The security game G LR−CBS consists of three phases as follows.
-Setup phase. By taking a security parameter τ as input, the challenger B performs the Setup algorithm presented in Definition 1, and obtains an initial system secret key • Public key retrieve query (ID): By taking a user's ID as input, B returns the associated public key PK ID = (PK ID,1 , PK ID,2 ).
• 
IV. THE PROPOSED LR-CBS SCHEME
In this section, the first LR-CBS scheme resistant to side-channel attacks is proposed that consists of five algorithms as follows.
-Setup: This algorithm is performed by the CA that takes as input a security parameter τ , and sets an admissible bilinear pairing mapê and its two associated groups G =< g > and G T =<ê(g, g) > of a prime order p, where g andê(g, g) are a generator of G and G T , respectively. The algorithm runs the following procedures to set the CA's initial system secret key SK CA = (SK CA,0,1 , SK CA,0,2 ) and public parameters PP:
(1) Randomly choose k ∈ Z * p , and set a system secret key SK CA = g k and the system public key PK CA =ê(g, g k ). VOLUME 7, 2019 (2) Randomly choose α ∈ Z * p , and set the initial system secret key ( (PK ID,1 , PK ID,2 ) , m, σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 )).
-Verifying: Given a signature (ID, PK ID = (PK ID,1 , PK ID,2 ), m, σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 )), a verifier sets b = ID||PK ID,1 and accepts the signature if the verifying equalityê(g,
holds; otherwise rejects it. By the key refreshing technique, we have
•
Hence, the correctness of the verifying equality is shown as follows.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In the proposed LR-CBS scheme, there are two types of adversaries that include Type I adversary (uncertified entity) and Type II adversary (honest-but-curious CA) according to the security game G LR−CBS . In the generic bilinear group model, Theorems 1 and 2 demonstrate that the proposed LR-CBS scheme is existential unforgeability against UF-LR-CBS-ACMA attacks for Type I and Type II adversaries, respectively. Theorem 1: In the generic bilinear group model, the proposed LR-CBS scheme is existential unforgeability against Type I adversary's UF-LR-CBS-ACMA attacks.
Proof: Let A I be Type I adversary (uncertified entity) and can adaptively issue all queries in the security game G LR−CBS at most q times. In the generic bilinear group model, there are two groups G and G T , and each element of both G and G T is encoded by a distinct bit-string. In addition, three group queries (oracles) Q G , Q T and Q p , respectively, denote the multiplication operation on the group G, the multiplication operation on the group G T and the bilinear pairing map operation from G × G to G T . Hence, Q G , Q T and Q p must be added to the Query phase of the security game G LR−CBS played by the adversary A I and a challenger B. Three phases of the security game G LR−CBS for the proposed LR-CBS scheme are given as follows.
-Setup phase: By taking a security parameter τ as input, B performs the Setup algorithm of the proposed LR-CBS scheme to produce an initial system secret key SK CA = (SK CA,0,1 , SK CA,0,2 ) and public parameters PP = (G,
and L K to maintain the input parameters and associated responses of queries issued by A I .
• Two lists L G and L T are used to maintain all elements of G and G T , respectively. • At the end of this phase, B returns the corresponding bit-strings of these public parameters g, U , V , X , Y and PK CA to A I . -Query phase: In the phase, A I may adaptively issue the following queries at most q times.
) and an OP operation (multiplication/division), B runs the following procedures to return the resulting bit-string ζ G Q,i,3 .
(1) B transforms two bit-strings ζ G Q,i,1 and ζ G Q,i,2 to get the associated polynomials G Q,i,1 and • Pairing query Q P (ζ G P,i,1 , ζ G P,i,2 ): For the i-th query Q P along with (ζ G P,i,1 , ζ G P,i,2 ), B runs the following procedures:
(1) B transforms ζ G P,i,1 and ζ G P,i,2 to get the associated polynomials G P,i,1 and G P,i,2 , respectively. (2) B computes the polynomial T P,i,1 = G P,i,1 · G P,i,2 . (3) B transforms and returns the bit-string ζ T P,i,1 of the resulting polynomial T P,i,1 .
• • For each query of Q G , Q T and Q P , at most three new elements are putted in L G or L T .
• For each Signing query, at most three new elements are putted in L G .
• For each Certificate generation query, at most three new elements are putted in L G .
• For each User key generation query, at most one new element is putted in L G and L T , respectively. Let q O be the total amount of all Q G , Q T and Q P queries. Let q S , q C and q U , respectively, denote the amounts of the Signing query, Certificate generation query and User key generation query issued by A I . Let |L G | and |L T | be the amounts of all elements in L G and L T , respectively. Since A I may issue all queries at most q times, we have
The maximal polynomial degree of all elements in L G is 2 due to the following reasons.
• g, U , V , X , Y and SK CA are new variates so that these polynomials have degree 1.
• The certificate CK ID has degree 2.
• In the Signing query, σ 1 has degree 1 and σ 2 has degree 2.
• In the group query Q G , the degree of G Q,i,3 is the maximal degree of G Q,i,1 or G Q,i,2 . (3) The maximal polynomial degree of all elements in L T is 4 due to the following reasons.
• The CA's public key PK CA has degree 2.
• In the User key generation query, PK ID,1 has degree 2.
• In Q P , the maximal polynomial degree of all elements in L T is at most 4 since it is computed by two polynomials in L G .
• In Q T , the degree of T Q,i,3 is the maximal degree of T Q,i,1 and T Q,i,2 . Assume that the total amount of all variates in both L G and L T is n. Hence, B chooses n random values z 1 , z 2 ,. . ., z n in Z * p . A I is said to win the security game G LR−CBS when one of the following two cases occurs:
Case 2: A I may output a valid signature (ID, (ζ PK ID * ,1 , • Without requesting Signing leak query and Certificate generation leak query: In the situation, except Signing leak query or Certificate generation leak query, A I is allowed to issue the other queries in G LR−CBS . The advantage that A I wins G LR−CBS has two cases as follows.
Case 1 V Let us evaluate the advantage that A I respectively discovers a collision in L G and L T . Let G i and G j be two distinct element polynomials in L G . The advantage of discovering a collision is the probability that G C = G i − G j is a zero polynomial, namely, G C (z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z n ) = 0. By Lemma 2, because the maximal polynomial degree of all elements in L G is at most 2 and no leak query is allowed (λ = 0), the probability of G C (z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z n ) = 0 is at most 2/p. Since there are 2 
Case 2 V The probability of this case is the advantage that A I outputs a valid signature(ID * , (ζ PK ID * ,1 , ζ PK ID * ,2 ), m * , (ζ σ * 1 , ζ σ * 2 )), namely, the signature satisfies f =
Since f has degree at most 3, the advantage of forging a valid signature is at most 3/p. 
Let us discuss the upper bound of Pr [ESKCA] . In the Certificate generation phase of our LR-CBS scheme, the user's certificate CK ID is a signature on the user's information ID||PK ID,1 by adopting the signature scheme in [15] . The probability Pr[ESKCA] is bounded by the probability that the adversary can compute the CA's whole system secret key SK CA • Q G , Q T , Q P , User key generation, Secret key, Public key retrieve, Public key replace queries are identical to those queries in the Query phase of Theorem 1.
(4) B respectively transforms σ 1 and σ 2 to return the signature bit-strings ζ σ 1 and ζ σ 2 to A II .
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND COMPARISONS
In this section, the performance analysis and comparisons are given. For convenience, the following notations are defined to denote the computation costs of two time-consuming operations in suitable bilinear pairing groups [42] .
• T p : The running time of a bilinear pairing operationê :
G × G → G T .
• T e : The running time of an exponentiation operation in G or G T . Indeed, the running time of a multiplication operation on G or G T is smaller than both T p and T e so that it is negligible. In addition, |G| denotes the bit-length of one element in G. Table 1 lists the comparisons between several previous CBS or SCBS schemes [31] , [37] , [39] and our LR-CBS scheme in terms of signing computation cost, verifying computation cost, signature size, proof model, CA adversary type and side-channel attacks. Obviously, the performance of the proposed LR-CBS scheme is not better than that of the previously proposed CBS or SCBS schemes [31] , [37] , [39] . For the CA adversary type, Zhou and Cui's CBS scheme [39] is secure against the malicious-but-passive CA attack, namely, the CA may forge a new signature (ID, m, σ ) from an existing signature (ID, m, σ ), where ID and m are the same identity and message, respectively. Nevertheless, the CA cannot forge a signature on an arbitrary message m if a signer with identity ID did not generate a signature on the message m. Indeed, the adversary model against the honest-but-curious CA attack defined in [30] , [32] , [33] , and [37] is enough to model the abilities of adversaries. Indeed, all existing CBS or SCBS schemes (including [31] , [37] , and [39] ) do not resist side-channel attacks. Up to date, no leakage-resilient CBS (LR-CBS) scheme resistant to side-channel attacks is proposed. The point is that our scheme is the first LR-CBS scheme which not only is resistant to side-channel attacks but also possesses overall unbounded leakage property.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A novel adversary model of LR-CBS schemes resistant to side-channel attacks under the continual leakage model has been defined. The novel adversary model permits Types I and II adversaries to continuously obtain partial information of both the CA's system secret key in the certificate generation algorithm and a signer's secret key and associated certificate in the signing algorithm. Under the novel adversary model with continual key leakage, the first LR-CBS scheme resistant to side-channel attacks was proposed. For resisting to continual key leakage, the proposed LR-CBS scheme adopts the key update technique to refresh the CA's system secret key after running each certificate generation algorithm and a signer's secret key and certificate after running each signing algorithm. Meanwhile, in the generic bilinear group model, the proposed LR-CBS scheme is proved to be existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks of Types I and II adversaries under the novel adversary model with continual key leakage. As compared with several previous CBS and SCBS schemes, our proposed LR-CBS requires some extra computation operations due to the key update process. The point is that our scheme is the first LR-CBS scheme resistant to side-channel attacks under the continual leakage model. Certainly, it is an interesting issue and future work to propose a novel LR-CBS scheme against the malicious-but-passive CA attack.
